

# **The Global War on Terrorism: A Policy of Containment**

**by  
MAJ Matthew G. Elledge  
U.S. Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
AY 02-03**

# **SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

## **MONOGRAPH APPROVAL**

Major Matthew G. Elledge

Title of Monograph: The Global War on Terrorism: A Policy of Containment

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
James J. Schneider, Ph.D. Monograph Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D. Professor and Director  
Academic Affairs,  
School of Advanced  
Military Studies

\_\_\_\_\_  
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Director, Graduate Degree  
Program

# **ABSTRACT**

## **THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: A POLICY OF CONTAINMENT**

Major Matthew G. Elledge, Army, 45 pgs.

This work asks two questions. Is the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, The Global War on Terrorism, (GWOT) a policy of containment and why does it matter? This work identifies the NSS as a policy of containment by comparing the national strategies of Presidents Nixon, Clinton and Bush. This comparison shows that although the strategic environment has changed the policy of containing threats has remained. Establishing that the United States national strategy is still a policy of containment, this work points out that the military has an excellent strategy already in place. That strategy is the National Military Strategy of 1997. This work asserts that the strategy clearly identifies the current threat and if aggressively implemented it can meet the political objectives stated in the NSS 2002.

Because the United States military is not large enough to fight the entire GWOT at one time, this work recommends a way to prosecute it at the operational level utilizing the elements of operational design and the operational framework provided in the Army FM 3.0.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	iv
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS .....	v
INTRODUCTION .....	1
The National Security Strategy .....	2
Comparison of Security Strategies .....	5
National Military Strategy .....	6
Global War on Terrorism—A Way .....	6
Conclusion .....	8
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002 .....	9
COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES .....	15
The Birth of Containment .....	15
The Nixon Doctrine .....	16
Engagement and Enlargement .....	17
Proactive vs. Reactive .....	19
THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY .....	22
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM—A WAY .....	28
Elements of Operational Design .....	28
Operational Framework .....	36
CONCLUSION .....	41
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	44

**TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS**

Figure 1 SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT..... 25

Figure 2 LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATIONS..... 32



## CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

Is the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) a policy of containment? Why does it matter? Its importance lies in the thought process and planning utilized by the unified combatant commanders that is critical in developing a GWOT. If in fact we find this “war” is a policy of containment then we have a concept of what works and what does not. Rather than “re-inventing the wheel” the unified combatant commanders can “re-build the wheel” to make it better and more suitable for the specific “terrain” needed for travel. Gary Klein would describe this as a “Recognition Prime Decision” (RPD) model. The RPD fuses two processes: the way decision makers size up the situation to recognize which course of action makes sense, and the way they evaluate that course of action by imagining it.<sup>1</sup> If the unified combatant commanders can recognize that they have seen this policy before, then their abilities to direct planning and execution of the GWOT can be more focused because they know “what right feels like”. On the surface, the RPD model may seem to be a broad stretch but this work shows that in fact, the GWOT is a policy of containment and it can work ultimately to defeat transnational terrorism.

Why a policy of containment? Using the “wheel” analogy and the containment policy is the wheel, which is time-tested and proven to work. The U.S. policy of containment during the Cold War came about to contain communism and ultimately defeat it. This policy worked. The Cold War is over but it has brought about a new set of problems and arguably a more complex world environment than during the Cold War. The complex environment has brought the transnational terrorist to the forefront.

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<sup>1</sup>Gary Klein, *Sources of Power* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 24.

President George W. Bush has identified transnational terrorism as the fundamental threat to stability throughout the world.<sup>2</sup> The transnational terrorists as cockroaches are a perfect example of the challenges that may lie ahead. Kill them in one house they eventually turn up in someone else's home; kill them there and they appear in another house and the cycle continues. Looking at the GWOT through a lens of containment, may allow the United States military to "re-build rather than reinvent the wheel" to contain and ultimately defeat transnational terrorism.

### **The National Security Strategy**

In defining the GWOT as a policy of containment it is important from the historical perspective to define containment policy and the situation from which it arose. More importantly, examination from a historical perspective of what the United States Armed Forces did to actualize this policy is necessary. President Harry S. Truman, in his NSC Policy Paper 68, stated that the United States had a moral obligation to meet the Soviet threat when and where it occurred.<sup>3</sup> Arguably, President Truman was the originator of a containment policy specifically focused on communism. From an historical perspective this work originates from the time of President Richard M. Nixon and his Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine came to the forefront of the U.S. security strategy on 3 November 1969, when President Richard Nixon addressed the nation on the war in Vietnam. This doctrine had three guidelines:

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<sup>2</sup>President George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", September 2002, intro, 1.

<sup>3</sup>President Harry S. Truman, "NSC policy paper 68", April 14, 1950;  
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm>; Internet; accessed November 01, 2002.



First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.  
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.  
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.<sup>4</sup>

The central theme of this doctrine is that the United States would help when asked, but the responsibility would fall squarely on the shoulders of the country asking for assistance. Containing communism through security assistance was the focus. The Carter Administration, as illustrated in Presidential Directive (PD) 18, carried on the policy of containment. PD 18 stated that the U.S. National Strategy should be to counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet military power and adverse influence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.<sup>5</sup>

The containment policy continued throughout the two terms of President Ronald Reagan. The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 arguably marked the defeat of communism through the use of a successful containment policy. However, the defeat of communism led to an unforeseen complex environment. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world went from a bipolar world to a more complex multipolar world. President Clinton's National Security Strategies of 1994 and 1996 were strategies of engagement

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<sup>4</sup>President Richard M. Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam", November 3, 1969,  
<http://www.uiowa.edu/~c030162/Common/Handouts/POTUS/Nixon.html> Internet; accessed September, 13, 2002.

<sup>5</sup>President Jimmy Carter, "Presidential Directive 18", August 26, 1977,  
<http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd18.pdf>; Internet; accessed November 01, 2002.

and enlargement. Philosophically there was not a threat from any nation state and the opportunity for a free and democratic world was open to us. Evidently the enemy was and continues to be non-state actors that oppose the values stated in the preamble of our Constitution.

Although George H. Bush's strategy of 1991 began to break away from a communism focus, the Clinton Administration's strategy is truly a break and an attempt to deal with the uncertainty that the defeat of communism brought to the international arena. In the preface of this strategy, the enemy is defined in physical and ideological terms. President Clinton identified the following as threats to our security and to that of our friends and allies: ethnic conflict, rogue states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation exacerbated by rapid population growth, and the organized forces of terrorism, international crime and drug traffickers.<sup>6</sup> Throughout this work's research has brought to light that the administrations from President Truman forward, have focused on specific regions and political entities from which a threat seemed to emanate. President Clinton's National Security Strategy (NSS) of 1994 and 1996 was the first to shift from a focus on communism to a focus of failed and weakened states that breed those threats mentioned in the NSS preface. This NSS is very consistent with Kaplan and Huntington in which both authors feel that the break down of nation states and a migration to like cultures is likely to occur because of an exploding population and degradation of natural resources to provide for this population. The by

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<sup>6</sup>President, William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" February 1996, <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 September, 2002.

product of this phenomena is transnational terrorism and international crime.<sup>7</sup> Since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush's NSS of 2002 states that transnational terrorism is the fundamental threat to security and stability throughout the world and in the United States.<sup>8</sup> President Bush continues with its strong agreement with Kaplan and Huntington.

### **Comparison of Security Strategies**

This work highlights the Nixon Doctrine, a strategy focused on containment of communism, the Clinton Doctrine, a strategy that is focused on non-nation state actors, and the current Bush Doctrine. After clearly defining the security strategies of the Nixon, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations, this work compares the three to show that although the international environment has changed, the policy of containment is the underlying theme of the strategies. If in fact the strategies are the same, then the unified combatant commanders have a guideline in developing plans within their respective Areas of Responsibilities under a containment strategy. This in turn will allow the unified combatant commanders a Clausewitzian *coup d'oeil*<sup>9</sup> of the environment under the containment policy and the ability to make sound decisions quickly. Clausewitz defines Coup d'oeil as the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection. If in fact the strategies are

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<sup>7</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2000).  
Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*; (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

<sup>8</sup> President George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", September 2002, 1, preface.

<sup>9</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984) 102.

the same then a look into the National Military Strategy of 1997 is appropriate as the military grapples with how to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism.

### **National Military Strategy**

The National Military Strategy (NMS) of 1997, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now* was written clearly to implement President Clinton's 1996 strategy of *Engagement and Enlargement*. This strategy is very important in that it clearly articulates the military's role within a NSS that was focused on non-nation state threats.<sup>10</sup> In 1997, GEN Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identified terrorism as cause for special concern.<sup>11</sup> Upon clearly defining the NMS of 1997 and "re-building the wheel" to meet today's international security environment, a military strategy to meet President Bush's strategy should become clearer. With a clearer picture of a NMS, is there a way for the unified combatant commanders to prosecute the President's Global War on Terrorism?

### **Global War on Terrorism—A Way**

As a working hypothesis, this work proposes that this war cannot be won by the military alone. However, if not the main effort, the military can definitely enhance the other elements of strategic power exposed in the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic). In defining a way to prosecute the GWOT this work focuses on

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<sup>10</sup>Although the 1995 NMS is written under the 1994 engagement and enlargement NSS, I believe that both the 1996 NSS and the 1997 NMS were better documents in defining the role of the U.S. and the U.S. armed forces in a non nation state threat environment.

<sup>11</sup>General John M. Shalikashvili, "National Military Strategy, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now---A Military Strategy for a New Era*" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2001), 3.

two areas. Elements of Operational Design is the first area. Conrad Crane of the Strategic Studies Institute (Army War College) states that, “A victory over terrorism will be meaningless if it is not accompanied by the continuing spread of peace, security, democracy, and free market ideas that those other military missions support”.<sup>12</sup> The operational tempo of the military was high before President Bush’s declaration of the GWOT. It is now higher than ever. The natural response to increased requirements is to provide more resources to meet these requirements. However, our focus needs to be developing a sound operational design that is sustainable. This work provides recommendations on an operational design that seeks both short and long term solutions to the GWOT challenge as well as maintaining stability once terrorism is defeated.

The second area of concentration offered here is a way to prosecute logically the GWOT. Stephen Biddle states that the war aim should not just be the defeat of the terrorists themselves, but the ideology that breeds that terrorism.<sup>13</sup> So how do we fight an ideology? Is this something new? What role does a military have in defeating an ideology that breed’s terrorism? I refer back to the ideology of communism. What was its center of gravity? What role did the military play in defeating the ideology of communism? Answering these questions may lead to logical lines of operations, which in turn might allow the unified combatant commanders the ability to define clearly an operational framework in which to prosecute and win the GWOT.

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<sup>12</sup>Conrad Crane, “Maintaining Strategic Balance While Fighting Terrorism”, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/maintain.pdf>, Internet; accessed September 24, 2002 1.

<sup>13</sup>Stephen Biddle, “War Aims and War Termination”, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/waraims.pdf>, Internet; accessed 24 October, 2002.

## Conclusion

Clausewitz states that “the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something alien to its nature”.<sup>14</sup> This work proposes that if the GWOT is a policy of containment, we as a military have executed missions under this policy before and know the elements of success. Given that we have an historical example of how to plan and execute missions, we now have a known framework to build and execute a way to prosecute the GWOT at the operational level.

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<sup>14</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88-89.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002

The 2002 National Security Strategy has made a huge shift from a reactive to a proactive tone. There is no longer an idealistic tone but a more realistic tone throughout the document. A realistic tone of no longer standing by and letting bad things happen before we react to it. A realistic tone of acting unilaterally if required. A realistic tone of willing to lose the proverbial moral high ground of reaction if we have information and intelligence that our security and the security of our friends and allies may be threatened. No longer can we wait on events to unfold and react, instead we must anticipate and take action.

Before looking at the history of the containment policy, it is important to understand where the United States is right now. President Bush identifies transnational terrorism as the fundamental threat to the stability of the global community.<sup>15</sup> He identifies weak states as a hot bed for terrorist organizations and we must be engaged in these regions to prevent their proliferation. President Bush states to the world what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.<sup>16</sup> He continues to state that these principles will

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<sup>15</sup>President George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", September 2002, 1, preface.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 3

guide our government's decisions about international cooperation, the character of our foreign assistance, and the allocation of resources.<sup>17</sup>

In chapter three of the NSS, priority of effort for the government is to the disruption and destruction of terrorist organizations with global reach. The NSS details how the United States will disrupt and destroy the terrorist organizations by:

- direct action against terrorist organizations of global reach and state sponsors of terrorism which attempt to gain weapons of mass destruction
- identifying and destroying the threat, through coalition or unilaterally, to American interests at home and abroad before the threat reaches our borders
- deny sanctuary to terrorists throughout the world<sup>18</sup>

Finally, the NSS states that wherever possible the United States will rely on unified organizations to meet their obligations to the international community; and if the terrorism overmatches the unified power's capability, then we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help our allies and we can provide.<sup>19</sup>

President Bush asserts that it will take time for us to win the Global War on Terrorism under two strategic principles:

- We will invest the time and resources into building international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises when they emerge
- The United States should be realistic about its ability to help but when and where people are ready to do their part, we will act decisively.<sup>20</sup>

It is interesting to note that in Chapter Four of the NSS President Bush identifies the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as critical in the destabilization of the region and the global

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.



community.<sup>21</sup> To the military planner Chapter Four may be the most important chapter in the NSS. It is here that President Bush lays out region by region what his priorities are and where the security focus should be. In South Asia the focus is on the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir to try and bring about a peaceful resolution to stabilize the area. In Indonesia we must continue to bolster our commitment to that government as it tries to make democracy work. In the Western Hemisphere President Bush speaks of continuing to strengthen ties and coalitions throughout our hemisphere to promote democracy and prevent drug cartels and terrorists organizations from gaining a foothold within these fledgling countries. At home the United States can help to stabilize the Western Hemisphere by reducing the demand for drugs in our own country.

President Bush specifically speaks to the trouble and turmoil in Africa. Because Africa is disease-ridden, war torn and in the throws of poverty they are ripe to be overrun with terrorist organizations with little humanitarian regard. This causes a hard look at the United States' core values of preserving human dignity and the strategic priority of combating global terrorism. The NSS describes three strategies to engage this region:

- Engage and focus on the four anchoring countries of South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia
- Coordinate with the international community to provide aide and assistance in conflict mediation and successful peace operations
- We must continue to strengthen the reforming states and sub-unified organizations to address transnational threats.<sup>22</sup>

In Chapter Five of the NSS President Bush lays out that our more proactive motives in the future versus reactive motives:

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 10-11.

Given the goals of rogue state and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past.... The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.<sup>23</sup>

The NSS lays out how we will be more proactive but more responsible than in the past. We will proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. to support preemptive options, we will:

- Build better integrated intelligence
- Coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats
- Transform the military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results<sup>24</sup>

In Chapter Six the NSS again takes on a more proactive tone in the economic field of endeavors. President Bush wants the United States to:

- To seize the global initiative by completing the accession of China and Taiwan to the World Trade Organization (WTO). As well as assist Russia in joining the WTO.
- Press unified initiatives by promoting the Free Trade Area of the Americas as well offer more opportunity to Africa.
- Move ahead with bilateral free trade agreements with Jordan, Chile and Singapore as well as aiming to mix other free trade agreements to developed and developing countries.
- Promote the connection between trade and development by implementing the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act to provide market access for nearly all goods produced in the sub-Saharan Africa.
- Enforce trade agreements and laws against unfair practices to make a global effort to address new technology, science, and health impede farm exports and improved agriculture.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 16.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 18-19.

The list continues but as you can see even in the realm of economics the NSS is very proactive in nature. It is proactive in that its focus is on providing support and opportunity to developing nations. More importantly this support will help to prevent more failed states which are breeding grounds for terrorists activities.

In Chapter Nine President Bush clearly lays out his vision for the military. Our military's highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our military must:

- assure our allies and friends;
- dissuade future military competition;
- deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
- decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.<sup>26</sup>

He recognizes that the threat to the United States and allies has changed and the military must transform in terms of how an enemy might fight rather than where or when a war might occur.<sup>27</sup> President Bush further defines the capabilities of the military to be able to defend the homeland, conduct information operations, ensure U.S. access to distant theaters, and protect critical U.S. infrastructure and assets in outer space.<sup>28</sup>

Although none of these ideas and concepts is new, they are clearly stated as specified tasks, not implied tasks of previous security strategies. Arguably the one new stated concept is that the President expects the military to do all the missions stated above as well as fight the war on terrorism and conduct Homeland Security. He clearly identifies intelligence as priority in fighting the war on terrorism and correctly identifies the need to integrate our intelligence communities throughout the Department of Defense,

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 30.

the Department of State, and the Department of the Interior, as well state and local law enforcement.

The NSS 2002 is a major contribution toward identifying the threats to the United States and in explaining the how and the why the United States will deal with those threats. Although past security strategies identified in some form or fashion the new global threat since the cold war, this NSS has a solid grasp of the threats, and how the United States will deal with them. Although this NSS is much more proactive in tone than previous strategies, it still has an underlying theme of containing terrorism and eventually destroying it.

In Chapter Three of this work the comparison of the NSS 2002 to the security strategies of President Nixon and President Clinton show that there is a shift from a communism focus toward a transnational terrorism focus. The comparison also shows that the NSS 2002 is much more proactive than the previous security strategies. Most importantly, however, throughout these shifts, the one underlying theme of the strategies is one of containment.

## COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

Why should there be a comparison of the NSS of 2002 to other strategies of the past? A look into the security policies prior to the 2002 NSS may show that although the enemy has changed, the process with which to defeat that enemy is the same. This work submits that if in fact these policies are the same and these policies have already worked in containing communism, then the strategies of containment stated in the NSS 2002 has some historical precedence suggesting that this type of strategy can work against the GWOT. The policy of containment eventually caused the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the enemy may have changed from communism to terrorism this work proposes that the policy of containment can work.

### The Birth of Containment

Although I have chosen not to compare President Truman's Policy to President Bush's National Security Strategy it is important to know where the policy of containment came from and the context within which it was written. President Truman was arguably "The Father" of the policy of containment. In April 1950 his administration produced a NSC Policy paper titled NSC-68, United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. NSC-68 stated that the United States had a moral obligation to meet the Soviet threat where it occurred. It called for American military and non-military support for anti-Communist governments around the world.<sup>29</sup> This

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<sup>29</sup>President Harry S. Truman, "NSC policy paper 68", April 14, 1950; <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm>; Internet; accessed November 01, 2002.

document researched and found that the Soviet Union was seeking to dominate and prevent a free capitalistic society where all of mankind had a chance to prosper. It was in the execution of this document that the policy of containment was born.

### **The Nixon Doctrine**

On 03 November 1969 President Nixon clearly defined his strategy to the American people with the backdrop of the Vietnam War. The “Nixon Doctrine” declared that the United States will contain communism by providing support to nations that are willing to help themselves. President Nixon’s policy had three main points:

1. The United States will keep all of its treaty commitments
2. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
3. In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.<sup>30</sup>

President Nixon’s policy was written to allow the United States to save face in pulling out of the war in Vietnam. It also shows once again that we were in the business of containing communism, albeit we were now defining how we would get and stay involved in doing so.

President Bush’s 2002 NSS writes in the same tone as President Nixon’s third point in the Nixon Doctrine, when he states that: The United States should be realistic about its ability to help but when and where people are ready to do their part, we will act

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<sup>30</sup>President Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam”, November 3, 1969, <http://www.uiowa.edu/~c030162/Common/Handouts/POTUS/Nixon.html> Internet; accessed September, 13, 2002.

decisively.<sup>31</sup> The NSS 2002 also states that: Wherever possible the United States will rely on unified organizations to meet their obligations to the international community and if the terrorism overmatches the unified power's capability then we will match their willpower and their resources with whatever help our allies and we can provide.<sup>32</sup> Although the enemy has changed from communism to terrorism, containment is still the policy.

## **Engagement and Enlargement**

The international strategic environment of the Clinton presidency was very different from all previous administrations since President Truman. His Presidency was marked by the United States grappling with being the only superpower on the planet. In his 1996 National Security Strategy we can see that although the United States did not have the Soviet Union as an enemy, it did have many other enemies and challenges to worry about. In the preface President Clinton defines those challenges that we faced in 1996:

The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to unified stability in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. Large-scale environmental degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine political stability in many countries and regions. And the threat to our open and free society from the organized forces of terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking is greater

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<sup>31</sup>President George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", September 2002, 7.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

as the technological revolution,...empowers these destructive forces with novel means to challenge our security.<sup>33</sup>

This identification of the challenges facing the United States is very important in that it is a true break away from communism as the number one threat, which drove our subsequent National Security Strategy. President Bush's lays out what he feels are the United States challenges in his National Security Strategy as well. He states up front that terrorism is the number one threat to America.<sup>34</sup> He also states that our enemies are seeking weapons of mass destruction and that although poverty does not make people into terrorists, it allows those nation-state institutions to weaken and become corrupt as well as become targets for terrorists networks and drug cartels. Although neither President prioritizes the enemies and challenges of the United States, we can infer from the order from which they were written as to what is the first focus of each administration. President Clinton's focus was on ethnic fighting and rogue states while President Bush states unequivocally at the beginning that transnational-terrorism is our number one challenge.

President Clinton's policy of engagement and enlargement are spelled out in three broad statements:

1. Our efforts to enhance our security by maintaining a cooperative security measures

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<sup>33</sup> President William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", February 1996, <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 September, 2002.

<sup>34</sup> President George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", September 2002, , preface.



2. Our work to open foreign markets and spur economic growth
3. Our promotion of democracy abroad<sup>35</sup>

President Clinton further defines his strategy and this definition falls in line with the policy of containment. In his NSS of 1996 he states that: “Our National security is therefore based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests”.<sup>36</sup> President Bush’s NSS states that providing a safe and secure world environment, that democracy will spread throughout the world and slowly choke out the oppressors as mankind begins to feel the prosperity that freedom brings. However, for that environment to come to the forefront President Bush, like President Clinton, states that the United States will:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- Work with others to diffuse unified conflicts
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy<sup>37</sup>

### **Proactive vs. Reactive**

This work’s premise is to show that the National Security Strategies of Presidents Nixon, Clinton, and Bush are inherently the same, in that they are policies of

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<sup>35</sup>President William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” February 1996, <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 September, 2002, 11.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>President George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, September 2002, 1-2.

containment. However, it is important to point out that the tone of President Bush's NSS is much more proactive and preemptive than his predecessors. The changes and proliferation of technology have put the world on notice that we no longer have the luxury of being reactive to terrorists and actions taken by rogue states. As the world's only remaining superpower President Bush put the world on notice when he stated: "The greater the threat the greater the risk of inaction...To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary act preemptively".<sup>38</sup> He also states that we will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require.<sup>39</sup> President Bush is very proactive in tone throughout the NSS 2002. He has to be. With the rise of the nonnation-state actor in world affairs there may be no diplomatic answer; there may not even be any diplomat to discuss alternate options to the unified conflicts.

Although Presidents Bush, Clinton, and Nixon had some significant differences in executing their different foreign policies they all agree that as President Truman stated in NSC-68 that the United States has a moral obligation to meet its "challenges" wherever they occur. I submit that although the challenge may have changed, the policy of containing that challenge is still the main method of these administrations. The policy of containing an enemy has worked in the past as seen in the fall of the Berlin Wall and all the implications of that event. Although all aspects of the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) were and are in play the area this work focuses on is the military aspect of containment. In response to President Clinton's NSS of 1996 the

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 31.

National Military Strategy (NMS) of 1997 was produced. If the NMS 1997 was a sound document then, did the events of 11 September 2001 really require us to change our military strategy, or should it just be improved upon to better meet the specific challenges identified in the NSS 2002?

## THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

On 11 September 2001, the way of life changed in the United States. As the course of events unfolded, the military began a frenzy of activity to develop a strategy in the fight against transnational terrorism. Do we need a “new” military strategy? Did someone not think about this in the past? I submit that we had a solid strategy that addressed terrorism, but the implementation of that strategy may have not been what it should have. Although conventionally the military has done well, asymmetrically speaking more detailed planning and execution on our part may have been able to help in the prevention of the terrible events on 11 September 2001.<sup>40</sup> Therein lies the problem. Leaders of the not-so-distant past identified terrorism as a serious threat; however, not until 11 September 2001 did it hit home how much of a threat it truly was. Using our most recent National Military Strategy (NMS), I argue that what we are grappling with today was already identified in 1997. I further argue, using the tenets laid out in the NMS 1997, that the strategy was already evident and that the true nature of the problem is in the implementation of that strategy.

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<sup>40</sup>I define asymmetry or asymmetrical in this document as a process of planning, implementing and combining resources both joint and inter-agency to bring about the endstate envisioned in the National Military Strategy. More succinctly, thinking and executing “outside the box”. Conventionally is the process of planning and implementing resources in a linear fashion. More succinctly, the process the military has always used.

So what is our National Military Strategy and is it the right strategy? The NMS of 1997 calls for **Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now** as its basic tenets.<sup>41</sup> In 1997, GEN Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explicitly identified terrorism as cause for special concern.<sup>42</sup> He also noted that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and information warfare require us to increase our capabilities to counter these threats and adapt our military doctrine, training, and equipment to insure rapid and effective joint and interagency response.<sup>43</sup> With these three concerns identified in the NMS, did we implement military initiatives to counter these threats?

Interestingly, President Bush identified Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil” in 2002.<sup>44</sup> The NMS 1997 had already identified these nations as unified powers that would challenge the United States militarily.<sup>45</sup> Though identified as military challengers, the NMS did not identify these nations as possible terrorist safe havens. However, I believe that there was an implied military task to view these possible challenges both as a conventional military threat as well as an asymmetrical threat. From a conventional standpoint the military has done well in focusing on these challengers.

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<sup>41</sup>General John M. Shalikashvili, “National Military Strategy, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now---A Military Strategy for a New Era*” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2001), 1.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>44</sup>President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address”, January 29, 2002, Office of the Press Secretary [speech on-line], <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>; Internet; accessed 21 August 2002.

<sup>45</sup>General John M. Shalikashvili, “National Military Strategy, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now---A Military Strategy for a New Era*”, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2001), 9.

Asymmetrically, an attempt to engage these challengers diplomatically and militarily through a theater engagement program to allow open communication with these challengers may help in preventing safe havens for transnational terrorist organizations.

One of the key points brought out in this report is the blurring of terrorist groups, ethnic conflict, insurgent movements, international criminals and drug cartels, as transnational dangers to the United States.<sup>46</sup> The blurring of these entities is important as we try to distinguish these extremist groups from their culture and religion.

Within the first paragraph of the Strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, in the NMS 1997, GEN Shalikashvili stated a secure homeland is fundamental.<sup>47</sup> I believe this opening assertion is key and begs the question: “If homeland defense was fundamental in 1997, why are we just now implementing Northern Combatant Command? If it was not needed when the Chairman identified homeland defense as fundamental, is it needed now? This work does not attempt to answer these questions, however, the point of these questions is that homeland security was raised as an issue in 1997 and it took an event such as 11 September 2001 before any action was taken. More to the point, the 1997 NMS is an excellent document to use if not in total, at least as a base for the writing of the NMS of the future.

### **Shape, Respond, Prepare Now**

“Shape” is defined as promoting stability through peacetime engagement, prevention, or reduction of conflicts or crisis, and peacetime deterrence.<sup>48</sup> The military

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
<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 11.

prior to 11 September 2001 had met this task from a conventional standpoint. However, what about the asymmetrical threat? The post-11 September international political environment is such that the military has an opportunity to engage nations that normally it would not have to confront. The issue with this is that the NMS identified terrorism of special concern in 1997 and as such, our military theater engagement policies with other nations that contain international terrorists should have reflected this strategy then as well as now. Unified powers were identified in 1997 that would challenge us.<sup>49</sup> I would submit that we should engage the countries surrounding those unified powers as well as the unified powers themselves through a military theater engagement policy. Engagement, in this context, is any peaceful means to communicate with another country. Through engagement we can shape a region to provide a more peaceful and stable environment. At a minimum engagement may allow us a semi-permissive environment to support the reduction of extremist groups within these unified powers.

“Respond” is defined in the NMS as having the capability to quickly halt hostilities in a region throughout the Full Spectrum of Crisis. (Figure 1)<sup>50</sup>



**Figure 1 SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT**

Again from a conventional standpoint the military has done well. We have pre-positioned equipment in Southwest Asia, which was identified and defined as most likely

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 12.

to have a crisis in the area in the NMS 1997.<sup>51</sup> We also have a forward presence in that area with semi-annual rotations to Kuwait and the continued vigilance of OPERATION SOUTERN/NORTHERN WATCH in Iraq. However, from an asymmetrical standpoint, the military missed an opportunity to shut down *Al-Qaida* by providing the Northern Alliance with training and equipment to rebel against the repressive Taliban government of Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001. The military responded rapidly after 11 September 2001 and destroyed the Taliban government and severely degraded the *Al-Qaida*. However, knowing and understanding the terrible lengths that terrorists groups are willing to go for “their cause”, if the 1997 military strategy had been more aggressively implemented I believe the tragic events of 11 September 2001 might have been minimized or avoided all together.

“Prepare Now” is defined as a transformation to maintain military superiority throughout the world. In this arena, the military has excelled in taking monumental leaps in “jointness” and their ability to integrate and execute missions together. Much more is needed, but Joint Vision 2010 set an azimuth for change in the military.<sup>52</sup> However, from the standpoint of the U.S. armed forces, we are still trying to define what asymmetry “tastes like, feels like, smells like”, and how should we plan and fight against it. The military utilization of Special Operation Forces (SOF), one of our best tools in an asymmetrical environment, with the Northern Alliance and conventional forces in Afghanistan, is an excellent example of integrating resources and executing operations in an asymmetrical environment to bring about success on the battlefield.

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 14.



In this chapter the study has demonstrated that a solid strategy identifying major concerns of transnational terrorists groups, and unified powers was in place prior to the GWOT. Using the major tenets of the NMS, this chapter described that in a conventional sense the United States armed forces has continued to do well in implementing that strategy; however, in an asymmetrical sense we are still deficient. Hindsight is always 20/20, and this chapter is wrought with “arm-chair quarterbacking”. However, this chapter is intended to suggest that if we had implemented the 1997 military strategy, that was written 4 years prior to the Global War on Terrorism, to its fullest extent, we might have achieved the balanced evolution that GEN Shalikashvili envisioned.<sup>53</sup> Once a NMS is approved, it is incumbent upon the United States armed forces to read, and fully comprehend it, and most importantly bring about its proper implementation.

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid., 14.

## **GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM—A WAY**

This work has put forth that the NSS of 2002 is a policy of containment and that in fact all security strategies since President Truman have been policies of containment. The object of that containment was communism. When the “wall came down” the focus of the National Security Strategies of President Bush Sr., Clinton, and Bush Jr. shifted from the Soviet Union to ethnic conflict and rogue states to terrorism and failing states. Though the tone of the National Security Strategies has transformed from reactive to proactive and the challenge has changed from state actors to non-state actors, the strategy of containment has been maintained.

This work also put forth that the National Military Strategy of 1997 not only stated the new challenges the United States Military would face in the future, but also provided a way in which to combat it (Shape, Respond, Prepare Now). It was the lethargic implementation of this strategy that may have faltered and allowed the military to stray from that strategy.

### **Elements of Operational Design**

With these two hypothesis in mind this work suggests “a way” of planning and executing a Global War on Terrorism. Taking into account the Elements of Operational Design the first element to be decided is the End State and Military Conditions. FM 3.0 states that at the strategic level the political end state is what the National Command

Authorities<sup>54</sup> want the situation to be when operations conclude.<sup>55</sup> JP 5.00.1 states that the end state is the thread of continuity that ties the strategic objectives to the operational and tactical levels of war.<sup>56</sup> President Bush laid out that end state in his State of the Union address in January 2002. “First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.”<sup>57</sup> With the end state provided for by the President, what can be inferred in developing military conditions?

- Major terrorist organizations defeated, bases destroyed.
- Forces positioned to secure previous terrorist sanctuaries as required
- Equipment and forces stationed world-wide to respond to future crisis
- Multinational cooperation in world-wide defense of terrorist networks

The next step in the Elements of Operational Design is deriving the Centers of Gravity (COG) both enemy and friendly. FM 3.0 states that the COG are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom

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<sup>54</sup>For continuity sake I have decided to keep the term National Command Authority(ies). Although no longer proper terminology for the President and the Secretary of Defense, for the purpose of this paper I have defined the National Command Authority to be the President, and the members of the National Security Council along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the military advisor.

<sup>55</sup>US Army. *FM 3.0 Operations* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-6.

<sup>56</sup>Joint Publications *JP 5.00.1 Joint Doctrine for Planning* (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 2002), II-3.

<sup>57</sup>President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address”, January 29, 2002, Office of the Press Secretary [speech on-line], <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> Internet; accessed 21 August 2002.

of action. It also states that the COG is a vital analytical tool that once identified becomes the focus of the commander's intent and operational design.<sup>58</sup> The enemy COG for terrorism is "the angry young man". The angry young man is 17-27 years old, has no job, and disillusioned by the realities he faces every day. He is normally not well educated but can be, as proven by 11 September 2001. The one underlying trait for all angry young men is that they are part of a population bulge that cannot be supported by the current resources provided. Without the "angry young man" there would be no recruits to execute terrorism. JP 5.00.1 provides a unique way at deriving ways to focus efforts in defeating enemy and protecting friendly COG. Now that the COG is identified what are the critical capabilities (CC) of the angry young man? Critical capabilities are crucial enablers for the adversary's COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary's objective.<sup>59</sup> The critical capabilities of the angry young man are:

- Money to allow the angry young man to provide for his family or raise his own standard of living.
- Training to prepare the angry young man for terrorist activity.
- Education. Although education is a good thing, it is the type of education that the angry young man receives that is the problem.
- Equipping the angry young man with proliferated technology that is cheap and effective.
- Safe Haven for the angry young man to be trained, educated and equipped.

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<sup>58</sup>US Army. *FM 3.0 Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-7.

<sup>59</sup>Joint Publications *JP 5.00.1 Joint Doctrine for Planning* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), II-7.


The next step in identifying ways to attack or defend the COG is to identify the Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities. Critical Requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means for the critical capability to be fully operational. Critical Vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of the adversary's critical capabilities, which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results, disproportionate to the military resources applied.<sup>60</sup> The Critical Requirements of money are the ability to produce it, procure it, and distribute it. The Critical Requirements of training is cadre to train, money to train, resources to utilize in training, and an area to train. The Critical Requirements of education is teachers, resources, and a location to educate. The Critical Requirement to equip is a supplier, a shipper, and money to purchase the equipment. The Critical Requirement of a Safe Haven for terrorists is a nation state willing to supply an area to the terrorist organization, money to "buy off" that nation state. The Critical Vulnerabilities of money is the ability to produce more of it through legitimate and illegitimate businesses. Another vulnerability is the ability to move it around to pay "employees" and debtors. The critical vulnerability of training is there must be cadre to train, there must be a sanctuary to train, there must be recruits to train, and money to pay for the resources to train. The critical vulnerabilities of education are money to pay for teachers and an uneducated populace. The critical vulnerability of equipping an organization is there must be money to pay a supplier, a shipper and a sanctuary to ship too. The critical vulnerability of a safe haven or sanctuary is that the terrorist organization has to provide some type of service for that nation state providing sanctuary.

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid., II-7.

More likely it is money, however, it can also be some type of covert mission for the nation state as well.

Figure 2 shows a logical line of operations to defeat the COG. In looking at the Logical Lines of Operations which is defined in FM 3.0 as the commanders link to multiple objectives and actions with the logic of purpose—cause and effect.<sup>61</sup>



**Figure 2 LOGICAL LINES OF OPERATIONS**

There are certain requirements and vulnerabilities that run through most of the critical capabilities. With that in mind decisive points and objectives can be identified. If in fact money is a critical requirement and a vulnerability that support all of the capabilities, then it would be prudent to put this as a number one priority. Although the

<sup>61</sup>US Army. *FM 3.0 Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001), 5-9.

diplomatic and economic strategic elements of power would more than likely take the lead the military would have a supporting role in possible destruction of businesses that produce, and distribute money. Second in priority is location. Location bisects across many of the capabilities. In this arena the military can play a significant role as one of the strategic elements of power with diplomatic, economic and information supporting. Thirdly the cadre to run the administration, education, and training is another arena that the military can play a significant role with the other strategic elements of power in support. Although this work has prioritized the top three of the requirements and vulnerabilities it is very likely that some or all of these can be executed simultaneously.

So what signs of culmination do the planners and executors of the war on terror look for? FM 3.0 defines culmination in this instance as a result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or lapses in protection leading to excessive casualties.<sup>62</sup> This definition answers the question of what to look for in culmination of the GWOT. With this definition in mind how do we prevent culmination? In this case the informational campaign, foreign and domestic, enemy and friendly alike must be attuned to informing the public on what we are doing, how we are doing it, what success we are having, and most importantly how long it may take to reach the end state. Another way of preventing culmination is balancing operational reach, approach, and pauses. Although FM 3.0 defines these terms with a military focus it should be inferred that these definitions apply to all strategic elements of power executing the GWOT.

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<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 5-10.

At the National Command Authorities level is where an operational pause can be planned and executed with relative security that culmination will not over take the GWOT. Operational pause is a deliberate halt taken to extend operational reach and prevent culmination...If the situation requires an operational pause, the commander should designate a new main effort.<sup>63</sup> In this case, the National Command Authorities designate which unified combatant commander is the main effort and pause to allow the elements of power to shift it support and plan the operational reach and approach to support that unified combatant commander. Operational Reach is the distance over which military power can be employed decisively, while operational approach is the manner in which a commander attacks the enemy center of gravity.<sup>64</sup> Using figure 2 in identifying the priority decisive points within each unified combatant commanders, Area of Responsibility can be identified and planned against during the operational pause.

Although another element of operational design is deciding on linear and non-linear operations, it is this work's contention that both operations will apply at different times of GWOT. Non-linear operations operate along multiple lines of operations—geographic, logical or both, while linear operations work in a sequential manner along its lines of operations.<sup>65</sup>

The last element of operational design is Tempo, the rate of military action.<sup>66</sup> In this case the GWOT should be looked upon from two aspects:

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 5-12.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.



1. Near-term: What can the strategic elements of power do immediately to defeat, interdict those critical capabilities of the angry young man.
2. Long-term: What can the strategic elements of power do over time (generational) to interdict and prevent the critical capabilities of the angry young man.

With these two aspects in mind, unified combatant commanders can better provide a plan to the National Command Authority when they are the main effort or the supporting effort. Although all elements of operational design are important, the key to all of it may be the tempo in which the United States fights the GWOT. Short term action interdicts terrorist organization and shows immediate success, however, the only way to defeat terrorism is through long term education, and training programs which must be planned in generational time increments. Most terrorist organizations espouse that they are the only true way to prosperity even though they are oppressive. The United States, as a free society, has a better way to pursue making a better standard of living than those before us. However, terrorist organizations have been selling their ideals in the schools and they have been engaging struggling populations for generations. If the citizens of the United States truly want transnational terrorism eradicated from the global community then they have to be continually informed that the GWOT is long term commitment.

So what should the mission statement look like? This work proposes something to this affect:

The U.S. military as part of an interagency, and multinational coalition, attacks to defeat transnational terrorist organizations around the globe and facilitate long term support as required to promote stability, security and peace to the world in order to prevent the threat of terrorism in the world community.

The commander's intent should state:

The purpose of this campaign is to provide a stable world environment that facilitates the growth of freedom, democracy, and capitalism throughout the global community. In order to do this we must first identify those terrorist organizations that are transnational in nature. Once identified, the strategic elements of power in coordination with coalition partners begin to engage those organizations and those areas that harbor them. Short term engagement is acquiring, interdicting and defeating those critical requirements and vulnerabilities that breed terrorism. Long term engagement begins at the educational and training level with a commitment of all coalition partners to provide the resources to promote a stable environment. The end state of this campaign will have the terrorist organizations defeated, and a coalition of nations prepared to preempt and prevent further terrorist attacks.

## **Operational Framework**

With the mission statement and intent in hand this work now provides an operational framework in the GWOT. Operational Framework is the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situations. It consists of the Area of Operations, Battlespace, and the Battlefield Organization.<sup>67</sup>

In defining the Area of Operations the unified combatant commanders must designate a Theater Organization. President Bush has stated that the war on terrorism is global. Taken literally the United States cannot support a global war all at once. However, if broken down into pieces and parts and given a Decisive Operation and Main Effort, the war can be won. The unified combatant commanders must identify those locations in their respective Areas of Responsibilities (AOR) that breed terrorism. Not only identify terrorist organizations themselves but identify those failing nation states that may not be able to defend itself against an onslaught of transnational organizations looking to recruit, educate and train angry young men looking for an outlet to improve

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 4-18.

their standard of living. These areas should be designated as Theaters of War. Theaters of War is the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war.<sup>68</sup> The Area of Operations (AO) should be identified as well as the Combat Zones. Both of these areas are sub-areas of the Theater of War. The AO should be utilized while the AOR is not the Decisive Operation/Main Effort. This area of operations in conjunction with other elements of strategic power should be the focus to contain and engage those areas to prevent them from becoming combat zones or at a minimum shaping the area to have a decisive victory when the AOR is the main effort. In defining Battlespace one must remember that it is conceptual in nature---a higher commander does not assign it.<sup>69</sup> The sub-components are:

1. Areas of Influence, the area in which a commander can directly influence operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command and control.<sup>70</sup> In the case of an area of operation, it would be that area in which we can institute some type of Theater Engagement Program. More specifically it would be any area that we can place "boots on the ground" to train and educate the angry young men within the unified combatant commander's AOR.
2. Areas of Interest, the area of concern to the commander including the area of influence and areas adjacent to it.<sup>71</sup> In the case of the GWOT it is any region

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<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 4-20.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 4-21.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

that we can not put “boots on the ground” but have substantial intelligence that this region is a breeding ground for the angry young man.

3. The Information Environment is the environment that encompasses information activity affecting the operation.<sup>72</sup> In this case the focus would be on the areas of interest, that we want to shape to allow a permissive environment to influence the angry young man.
4. Force Projection Bases and Home Station are the last two components of battlespace and in the case of GWOT must be considered heavily. The operational pause may ensure that the servicemen are prepared to move into the next “phase” of the GWOT. If there is no operational pause there may be lapses in security and morale at home and abroad may begin to wane.

The last element of the Operational Framework is the Battlefield Organization, which is the allocation of forces in the AO by purpose.<sup>73</sup> The National Command Authority determines the Decisive Operations with the information provided by the unified combatant commanders and the political environment. Decisive Operations are defined as those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters.<sup>74</sup> In this case, Decisive Operations may be phased as resources are allocated to the specific unified combatant commander while all other unified combatant commands start to shape their respective AORs in preparation for becoming the Decisive Operation. Shaping

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid., 4-22.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 4-23.

Operations creates and preserves conditions for the success of the Decisive Operation.<sup>75</sup>

In this case transnational terrorist organizations will more than likely cut across the unified combatant commands and the Shaping Operations can not only ensure success in the Decisive Operation's AOR but help to shape their respective AORs in preparing for future decisive Operations.

To sum up this chapter this work has identified that the COG of transnational terrorism is the angry young man. To defeat this COG the United States military as part of an interagency and international coalition attacks to interdict and or defeat those critical requirements and vulnerabilities. Within the United States interagency the National Command Authorities, because of limited resources, decides where the Decisive Operation is within the unified combatant commands. All others continue to shape the respective AORs utilizing Theater Engagement Programs in the Areas of Influence and Information Operations in the Areas of Interest to allow for the success of the ongoing Decisive Operation while shaping their respective AORs into permissive environments. The end state of GWOT is the terrorist organizations defeated, and a coalition of nations prepared to preempt and prevent further terrorist attacks.

This work focused on the enemy COG; however, the interagency and international coalition should identify their own COG to protect and preserve it from the enemy. This work has in passing proposed the will of the U.S. population to support this war is the friendly COG. Although there may be many critical capabilities to this COG it is not this work's intention to focus on those capabilities except one. It is one that we should always be able to protect or utilize but rarely have success with. Information

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

Operations would be the one capability that the interagency should focus on constantly. President Bush and his administration have done an admirable job in keeping the public informed on the GWOT. However, this should be a capability that should always be an asset to us not a liability. It is not the intention of this work to investigate Information Operations in great detail. However, Information Operations are campaign multipliers that should always be planned out in great detail. If Information Operations are not utilized to its fullest potential then the friendly COG may be vulnerable to enemy Information Operations.

This work provides a way for the military, in conjunction with interagencies, to prosecute a GWOT. Utilizing the elements of operational design this work provides a way to both sequentially and simultaneously defeat the terrorists' COG. Using the operational framework allows for the military to focus on a decisive operation while shaping for a future conflict. This work asserts that if the civilian and military planners focus on the elements of operational design and battlefield framework to build a way to prosecute the GWOT that this war can be won.

## CONCLUSION

This work started by asking the following questions:

- Is the Global War on Terrorism a policy of containment?
- Why does it matter?

This work answered the first question by highlighting some of the key points in President Bush's National Security Strategy. The NSS 2002 laid out the challenges that lie ahead. It regionally lays out a strategy to deal with these challenges and it provides an end state for this proactive strategy once it is complete. After highlighting the NSS 2002 this work looked back in history to find when and why the policy of containment came about. Then a comparison of the Nixon, Clinton, George W. Bush administration strategies was conducted. The comparison found that the policies are fundamentally the same except in two areas. One, the challenges have changed, and two, the proactive nature of this most recent NSS is new to the domestic and international community. All three strategies want to contain the challenges that lie ahead, be it communism, rogue states, or transnational terrorism. The proactive nature of the NSS 2002 is unique in that it is more of a realistic view of how the United States will act in global politics and how it will conduct business with the global community. Although I do not believe that the current administration relishes the fact that to protect the country it may turn to hegemonic ways to do so. To move in a preemptive manner may put the United States off of the proverbial high ground of reacting, but it may have to be done to protect itself

and the global community from transnational terrorism and the NSS says the United States will act accordingly. In the final analysis these strategies are policies of containment. So what?

At the introduction of this monograph Clausewitz was identified as pointing out that it is extremely important to identify the nature of the war that we are about to enter. With that said the answer to the second question of this work is broken down into two parts. A look back at the National Military Strategy of 1997 provided an insight to the evolving challenges that were out there and a way to engage these challenges. The second part of the answer is providing a way to define the challenge and a way to attack it.

The NMS '97 document was and still is a relevant document today. The NMS '97 "bumper sticker" of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now is as profound now as it was then. However, the implementation of the NMS '97 was weak at best. While the military services searched for its relevance in the world the NMS '97 provided a way. However, this work proposes that if the NMS '97 was properly (aggressively) implemented September 11<sup>th</sup> may have been minimized or it may have never happened.

Part two of the answer provided a way to prosecute the GWOT. If in fact the GWOT is a policy of containment and the policy of containment defeated communism, and communism is an ideology, just as terrorism is based on ideology, then we have a way of defeating terrorism. This work provided a way by utilizing the elements of operational design and establishing an operational framework. Using this doctrine showed that what we as military did in the past to defeat communism can work now if it is executed more aggressively. In utilizing the elements of operational design this work



showed that the angry young man is the COG of terrorism and provided some critical requirements and vulnerabilities to defeat this COG. In defining the COG this work provided a possible mission statement and commanders intent for the interagencies of the United States defense network. In developing a battlefield framework this work utilized the commander's intent to arrange forces to defeat terrorism in the short term as well as prevent transnational terrorism from becoming a viable force in the long term.

The "so what" is that the GWOT is a campaign we can win. It is a campaign that is going to take a long time. A long time, being generational to be a success. Maybe even many generations before it is successful. However, the United States has won a war of ideologies in the past and it can do it again if it recognizes the nature of this war, aggressively pursues its stated strategy and keeps its citizens informed.

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